In medicine we are taught that common things are common, as exemplified by the example that canaries are not common in the UK. I enjoyed Hadridge and Pow's article in January (JRSM 2008 ;101:7-11) 1 but I think flamingos will remain rare birds in the UK NHS. The centre at the Department of Health both fears and underestimates doctors. It has no confidence or trust in either doctors' abilities or motivations. Hence it seeks to regulate and control them, thereby stifling medical curiosity. This destroys medical connectedness, and ultimately it is only a residual medical professionalism that keeps compassion to patients in place, and this gets steadily reduced over time.
Meanwhile a senior Department of Health adviser asks if doctors and other caregivers are knights or knaves.
Hadridge and Pow talk about tuning into the deep culture of an organization. In the NHS there are three alternative discourses. One is the orthodox management line emphasising 'clinical engagement'. It is exemplified by glossy newsletters and mission statements that the workers know do not reflect reality, but only the management's distorted version of reality. Another is the formal medical discourse which hardly trusts management and its motives, but expresses itself carefully. The frank expression of the medical view is given on the medical blogs by Dr Crippen (http://nhsblogdoc.blogspot.com/) and Dr Rant (www.drrant.net/) and in the discussion fora at www.doctors.net.uk. The stories that doctors tell of the NHS speak of despair and disconnection. Doctors struggle to make sense of what is happening in their organization, and the suspicion is of hidden government agendas.
The 
Evidence based management
Although waiting to witness flamingos in flight is a great improvement on pigs, I believe Hadridge and Pow (JRSM 2008;101:7-11) 1 understate some of the issues to be addressed before the NHS flock can take to the air. Their exhortation to have more confidence and curiosity, become more connected and show more compassion would seem worthy enough, but their strategy for inducing the cultural change required to 'sort out' the health system stops short of describing meaningful action below the layer of high level organizational leaders. This may be an unfortunate emphasis, as previous calls for studies to increase our improvement effectiveness have highlighted issues associated with the inverted power structure of healthcare organizations and the need to explore and understand this dynamic. 2 In contrast to Hadridge and Pow, though sharing similar objectives, Keroack and colleagues 3 describe how they developed and used a composite index of quality and safety, based on patient-level data and the six attributes of an ideal health system articulated by the US Institute of Medicine: safe, effective, timely, efficient, equitable and patient-centred. 4 Keroack et al. looked in depth at 79 US Academic Medical Centres and identified a distinctive set of behaviours and organizational practices which were uniquely associated with the top-performing hospitals. Although themes identified by this group have clear echoes with Hadridge and Pow's 'four Cs', the work of Keroack et al. might help further NHS organizational quality improvement in at least two important ways. First, by describing an approach that produces robust evidence supporting the value of specific operational practices it helps address the increasingly heard call for evidence-based management. Second, by encouraging the pursuit of improved healthcare through interventions at levels deeper than senior leadership, it brings a focus to the interface between those in service-line clinical leadership positions and front-line workers. Having experienced healthcare improvement efforts from the perspective of a Medical Director, Clinical Director and front-line clinician, I suspect that effective engagement at this interface may be a crucial factor if NHS improvement is to spread its wings. 
Sean O'Kelly

NHS culture depends on enlightened leadership and aligned incentives
The recent article on 'What the NHS needs to improve' (JRSM 2008;101:7-11) 1 identifies four valuable ingredients of a good culture but omits what is needed to achieve it. As a professor of comparative health care systems who has worked closely with many parts of the NHS since the Thatcher reforms, I think the answers are most clearly found in the transformation of the US Veterans Health Administration from a public, politicized system considerably worse than the NHS in the early 1990s to one considerably better that outperforms even the great medical centres. The key elements are a coherent master plan for patient-centred care that rewards quality and value for money, a strong and steady leadership to implement the plan at every level from regional to individual service design, the elimination of perverse incentives, and the construction of aligned incentives at every level.
Most of the costly and extensive reforms of the NHS I have witnessed since 1990 have been half-baked and partially contrary to the previous ones so that an accretion of crosscutting changes has developed. Powerful, perverse and non-aligned incentives undermine the development of cost-effective, integrated services. Leaders keep changing, and each new one asserts his or her presence by correcting or reversing previous initiatives and instigating new ones. Current initiatives -such as 'payment by results', which has nothing to do with payment by results but rather payment by activity -build in perverse incentives that will distort services in new ways. Until the economics and organisation of services support cost-effective, integrated services of quality for patients, a culture of Confidence, Compassion, Connectedness and Curiosity will not happen.
Ockham's razor
Douglas Wardrop (JRSM 2008;101:50-1) is right in commenting that the scholastic logic of Ockham's razor is of limited relevance to geriatric medicine. Geriatricians have long taught their students that if an old person admitted to hospital has less than 5.5 or 6.5 diagnoses he or she (respectively) may have been inadequately assessed. But I was surprised to see so little deference to probability in the Editorial. It is not the number of different 'entities' -a fine scholastic concept -but their probabilities that matters. One of my patients with ulcerative colitis developed a peripheral arthropathy that the literature claimed as a rare complication of chronic bowel disease. Calculation revealed that it was much more likely that she had rheumatoid arthritis as well as her bowel disease rather than the single diagnosis decreed by Ockhamism. Conversely, decades before Lewy Body Disease was defined it was obvious that Parkinsonism (clinically diagnosed) and dementia (also clinically diagnosed) occurred together far more often than was compatible with independent incidence. This prophesied the existence of at least one unrecognised unifying 'entity'. But probabilities varying with sex, age and other demographic factors can be difficult to estimate from conventional medical literature. How much easier both clinical diagnosis and research would be if the NHS had an accessible system of epidemiologically structured medical records matching that of an American Health Maintenance Organization. We could then forget the scholastics.
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Hospital ownership
It was no surprise to read that the ownership style of NHS providers has had little impact on productivity except where owners could cherry-pick their clientele (JRSM 2008; 101:59-62) . 1 Health care has many facets. There is no universal panacea. Ownership of the hospital service started with compulsory purchase, followed by rationalization in the form of asset stripping and land sales with doubtful benefit to the local population except where centralization enabled the provision of new buildings which were fit for purpose. The notion that the NHS has to pay its way ignores the fact that it was set up as a national charity (funded by compulsory donations), not a bucket factory. The fiscal fallacy was that an overall improvement in the health of the nation would ultimately lead to a reduction in demand. Free lunches typically generate appetites where previously there had been none. Ownership should mean more than just possession of the freehold. It should embrace the desires and aspirations of the workforce and generate pride and passion for the service provided. Whilst wastage and financial exploitation should be guarded against, the ethos 'free at the point of access' should remain untainted. Changes aimed at making the service more effective need to focus on the patient, not the purse. Where this leads to more efficient budgetary management, that is a bonus, not a prerequisite. Foundation status is unlikely to change anything other than ownership style unless all participants -including management boards -are subjected to the same 'place of residence' membership criteria. It is obscene that directors should be able to make health care decisions applying to others knowing that they and their relatives would not have to endure the defects which they have imposed on the service.
Historically, changing ownership or the logo has merely allowed managers to indulge in musical chairs. 
Mark Aitken
Medical progress depends on animal models -doesn't it?
With regard to the JRSM article 'Medical progress depends on animal modelsdoesn't it?' (JRSM 2008;101:95-8): 1 there is misunderstanding in the preclinical science field about applying bias-reducing principles to animal research. 2,3 Animal project licence applications should be supported by references to systematic reviews of all the existing relevant human and animal studies, documenting the materials and methods used to show how the reviewer attempted to minimize bias. The Home Office Inspectorate should not be satisfied by reference to bibliographic databases and statistical analyses alone because these do not take into account publication bias and variability in quality of bibliographic searching skills. The reviews need to take account of completeness and quality of research and address the probability that null results had not been reported as equally as were the positive results. The applicant needs to show that they have searched for and assessed what relevant research has already been done and, of equal importance, to show what relevant research has not been done.
Failure to apply these principles was highlighted by Kenter and Cohen in their assessment of the TGN1412 drug trial. 4
